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Moral Prerequisites of Political Support: Business Reactions to 
the Watergate Scandal * 
JANET M. CLARK 
New Mexico State University 
Two basic components of support for political authorities have general ly 
been distinguished. Easton argues that "specific support" is generated by 
direct benefits which individua ls or groups perceive as coming to them from 
the po litical system while "diffuse support" involves a mor e de ep-seated 
reserve of good will towards th e polity. 1 On e of the supposed bases for diffuse 
support is respect for the "rul es of the game," defined by Tmman as expecta-
tions so widely held in a society that th ey are taken for granted. They 
constitute the popular attitudes regarding the limits of authority and what the 
government shou ld do and how it should do it. 2 Despit e the general accep-
tanc e of Truman 's th eory regarding the impor tance of observing the "rules of 
the game" for maintaining political support, few empirical studies have been 
made concerning th e actual impact upon support resulting from eve nts affect-
ing political norms which did not materially affect citizens. 3 In particular , 
there has bee n littl e examina tion of whether blatant political immorality can 
erod e the support of a group for a particular incumb en t who has supplied 
specific satisfactions and benefits to it in the past. 
Th e effects of the Watergate scanda l upon support for the Nixon Adminis-
tration among business int erests shou ld provid e an illustrativ e case study of 
this situation. In 1972, Pr esident Nixon was re-elected with one of the largest 
majoriti es in American history . 4 Although the American busin ess community 
is not monolithic and is composed of individuals with political persp ectives 
* A previous version of this paper was presented at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Chicago, August 29-Septembe r 2. The author wou ld like to thank 
Professor Cal Clark of New Mexico State Unive rsity for his helpful comments on ear lier drafts. 
H e is not , however , responsib le for the conclusions reached herein. 
1 David Easton , A Systems Analysis of Political Life ( ew York: John Wiley & Sons , Inc., 1965) 
pp. 273-275. 
2 David Truman , The Governmental Process: Polit ical Int erests and Public Opinion (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951) pp. 512-514. 
3 See Edward N. Muller , "Co rrelates and Consequences of Beliefs in the Legitimacy of 
Regime Structure ," Midwestjollrnal of Political Science (August , 1970); and Edward N. Muller, 
'The Represen tation of Citizens by Political Authorities: Consequences for Regime Support ," 
American Political Scienc e Review (December , 1970). 
4 At the start of his second term, President Nixon's .. actions" were approved by 67% of the 
American public , for examp le. Gallup Opinion Index (February , 1973) p. 3. 
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from both sides of the ideological spectmm, businessmen are generally con-
servative;5 and spokesmen for business were generally favorable toward the 
first Nixon Administration which was perceived as being business oriented. 
Specific policies drew some criticisms, but for the most _part , businessmen 
were satisfied with his actions and particularly anxious for hi victory over 
Senator McGovern who appeared too radical for business tastes. 6 At the start 
of his second term of office, Mr . Nixon's actions were approved by 68% of the 
business and professional people. 7 Yet as Watergate and its associated scan-
dals unfolded , support for the President eroded significantly. By the end of 
the year , the level of approval of his actions had dropped by 42 percentage 
points among the business and professional group. 8 
METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES 
The purpose of this paper is to discover how moral issues can influence 
political support in the United States by showing how much the Watergate 
scandal detract ed from President ixon' s support among one of his foremost 
constituencies , the business community, and how lasting these effects proved 
to be. To accomplish this , editorial statements and feature articles in the major 
business publications were analyzed for the period beginning in January , 
1969, and ending with December , 1974. 
This study includes all editorials concerning the Nixon Administration in 
five journals during this six year period. Three factors were considered in 
coding the editorials and feature articles: 1) the subject matter , 2) the attitudi-
nal valence, and 3) the number of subjects or attitudes covered. Only those 
editorials or features that discussed President ixon personally , his appoin-
tees , or Nixon Administration policy were included in the sh1dy. These were 
then separated into categories according to the subject matter discussed (see 
Appendices I and II for a list of these issue areas). They were also evaluated 
according to the valence of the attitudes expressed. Editorials and articles 
which used statements and adjectives which were complimentary towards the 
Nixon Administration were classified as positive , while those which used 
critical or unfavorable statements were classified as negative. Statements 
which raised questions, made recommendations , or offered explanations of 
ixon policies without making explicit evaluations of current policy or per-
sonnel were included in the neutral category. In other words , the neutral 
category was used as a catchall for any statement that was not clearly suppor-
5 Bruce M. Russett and Elizabeth C. Hanson , lnt erest and Ideology: The Foreign Poli.cy 
Beliefs of American Busin essme n (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company , 1975) provide 
detailed data that belie many of the stereotypes about business attitudes. 
6 Janet M. Clark , "Interest Groups' Relations with the Pres idency: Business Perceptions of the 
l ixon Administration ," paper presented at the 1973 Conference of the Southwest Social Science 
Association, Dallas, Texa~. 
7 Gallup Opinion l11dex (Feb rua,y , 1973) p. 3. 
8 Ibid ., Qanuary, 1974) p. 4. 
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tive or critical. Many of the editorials and feature articles expressed a single 
evaluation of only one subject area; and these were recorded only once no 
matt er how many adjectives or statements were used to reflect their opinion. 
Th ere were some articles, though , which were more complex, covering more 
than one subject area or expr essing varying attitudes toward th e same subject 
or both . In th ese cases, each separate attitude was record ed und er the 
appropriate subject category; so that ther e are mor e separat e opinions re-
corded than there were editorials. 
To assess th e reliability of the coding sch me, a sample of 10 issues from 
each ofth five journals was coded ind epend ently by a second judg e . Because 
of mor e than one subject per editorial and some journals with mor e than one 
editorial per issue, 60 references were coded as to both their issue area and 
affective valence by the second judge. Th e reliability of the coding was fairly 
high as th ere were four errors in issue area coding and five in dir ection of 
evaluation for an overall percentag e agreement score of 93%. 9 one of the 
coding disagree ments , furth er , were momentous ones a all concerned a few 
"bord erlin e" decisions that shou ld not affec t th e primary thrust of this 
analysis. 10 
On the basis of the findings of Bauer, Pool , and Dexter, it was assumed not 
only that business publications tend to reflect the views of their readerships 
but also that th ey help to form th e attitudes of their readers.11 Whil e editorial 
opinion may not be as efficient in detec ting support for ixon as mor e dir ec tly 
political activities by busin essmen, the examin ation of journal editorials has 
the advantage of providing specific evaluations of ixon' s performanc e and of 
indicating the reasons for those evaluations . Emphasis was placed on editorial 
statements and featur e materials because they tend to make evaluations more 
forthrightly than the subtle and ambiguous "slants " of news stories. The 
findings of the cont ent analysis were then compared with poll data indicating 
opinions of busin essmen at large. 
9 For a good discussion of the percentage agreeme nt score in conte nt analysis see Richard L. 
lerritt , Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 
1970) pp. 86-88. The formu la for it is: 
PO = 2r,.1,/(r a + r1,) 
where P0 is the percentage agreement score, r" is the number of items recorded by judge A, r1, is 
the number of items recorded by judge B, and r,1, is the number of items coded similarly by the 
two judges. 
10 Regard ing issue area , there was one disagreement between defense and fore ign policy 
focus; two domestic pol icy codes by one judge were put in the style and staff categories by the 
other; and for one edito rial, a econd issue area was not coded by one of the judges. In additi on to 
one noncoding , the other four valence errors were composed of neutral versus positive or 
negative eva luations. 
11 Raymond A. Bauer , Ithi el de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter , America n Bllsiness and Publi c 
Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade (New York: Atherton Press , 1963) p. 470. For a imilar 
methodology for investigating bus iness and military foreign policy beliefs th rough a con tent 
analysis of the business and military press, sec Russe tt and Han son, op. cit .. Chapte rs 6 and 7. 
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For this study , Business Week, Forbes, Fortun e, Nation's Business, and The 
Wall Street Journal were used to gain a cross-section of th e general views of 
the busin es world. Th ese journals were selected since th ey are specifically 
directed toward busin essmen and , furth ermor e, because they constitute the 
major general busin ess publications in terms of readership and circulation .12 
As a result of the analysis of these journal ' evaluations of 1 ixon' s first four 
years in office, they were rank ed according to their support for the Pres ident , 
principal areas of editorial concern , and general liberalism or conservatism. It 
was then possible to compare th e reactions of th e various journals to the 
Watergate scandal to tes t the following hypoth eses: 
H 1. Support for ixon should drop substantially in all journals as the 
Watergate scandal becam e increasingly salient during 1973 because 
of both the political and economic crises occurring simultaneously. 
H2 . Qu estions of administrative int eg rity should be rais ed earli er and 
str esse d mor e throughout the period of scandal investigation by the 
mor e liberal journals. 
H3 . The mor e conservativ e journal s should react to th e man y unfavor-
able revelations primarily by confining th e ir criticisms to th e 
economi c realm. 
84. The more conservative journals should mor e quickly resum e th eir 
previous leve ls of support for Nixon and argu e that "th e past should 
be forgotten " and that he should be allowed to remain in office. 
EVALUATIONS OF THE FIRST FOUR YEARS 
The business publications were generally supportive of Pr esident Nixon 
durin g his first term of office, and favorabl e comments regarding his polici es 
far outnumb ere d the criticisms. Neve rth eless, there were notic eabl e varia-
tions in th e leve l of relativ e support given the Pr esident and in the typ es of 
policies preferred by the various spokesmen for busin ess. Support also fluc-
tuat ed within each publication over tim e. Th e more conservative journals 
exhibit ed greater enthusiasm at th e beginning of th e term but became mor e 
critical as time pass ed . Th e mor e cosmopolitan and liberal journals , howeve r , 
were skep tical at th e beginning but warm ed toward 1ixon's perceived 
achieveme nts. 13 Tabl e I summarizes the natur e of the commentary about 
President ixon in all five of the journals ; and Tabl e 2 shows what policy areas 
received the greates t amount of commentary and support. 
12 Edward C. Bur sk, "New Dim ensions in Top Executive Reading," Harvard Business Reuiew 
(September -October , 1957) pp. 93-112. More recent circulation figures are available in the 
January, 1973, Circulation Bull et in, of Natio n's Business. 
13 For a much more detail ed analysis of Nixon's first term see Clark, op. cit . 
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TABLE 1. Business Editorial Evaluations of the First Nixon Administra-
tion , 1969-1972 
Positive Negative Neutral Ratio 
% N % N % Pos/Neg 
Forbes . ... ..... .... ... 75 78 9 9 12 13 8.7:1 
Busin ess W eek .... . .... 105 53 55 28 39 19 1.9:1 
Wall Stre et Journal . .... 69 46 37 25 44 29 1.8:1 
Nation's Busin ess . . . . . . 57 51 32 29 22 20 1.8:1 
Fortun e . . ............. 39 53 25 34 10 13 1.6:1 
TABLE 2. Evaluations of Specific Aspects of the First Nixon Administra-
tion, 1969-1972 
Total Positive Negative Neutral 
Economic .............. .. .... 194 99 48 47 
Domestic Policy ........ ' ... .. 160 89 41 30 
Foreign Policy ......... ....... 92 69 12 11 
Personal Attribut es & Style .... 54 19 15 20 
Staff ......................... 45 34 8 3 
Budgetary Policy .............. 42 12 18 12 
Executive Reorganization ...... 24 16 5 3 
Defense Polic~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10 7 3 
A major concern of all the journals was President ixon' s economic policies 
concerning inflation control , taxation , labor relations , international trade , and 
anti-h·ust suits, which directly affect busin ess operations. Moreover , since the 
economy is the field of most immediate concern to busin essmen , the most 
significant editorial differences occurred in this area. Whil e all the journals 
expressed more approval than disapproval of Mr . ixon's economic policies, 
th e proportion of approval varied (see Appendix I for the individual journals' 
support by issue area). Forbes was by far the most supportive with positive 
evaluations occurring seven times more often than negative comments. For-
tun e, on the other hand , criticized ixon's economic polici es nearly as often as 
it prais ed them. It was particularly opposed to any obstacles to international 
free trade and to his anti-trust actions. Nation's Busin ess and Busin ess Week's 
evaluations werr twice as likely to be favorabl e as negative, while th e ratio was 
thr ee -to-one favorable for th e Wall Street Journal . Variations in support also 
MORAL PREREQUISITES OF POLITICAL SUPPORT 45 
occurred regarding specific economic issues and between tim e periods for a 
I , 14 ing e issue. 
Dom estic pro grams regarding welfare reform , environmental protection , 
health insurance, revenue sharing, and mass transit were also important to the 
business spokesmen who were generally supportive of finding solutions for 
these troublesome probl ems; and President Nixon's polici es in this field were 
approved by a more than two-to-one margin. All of the journals overwhelm-
ingly supp orted President Nixon's foreign policy measures throughout his 
entir e first term; and prais e for his initiativ es peak ed in 1972 as a result of the 
Peking and Moscow trips . In general, the journals assumed a fairly "dovish" 
tance towards foreign policy and defense matters .15 Critical comments out-
numbered positive ones in only one major policy area. Most of the busin ess 
press opposed Mr. Nixon's deficit budgets . Fiscal responsibility had been one 
of the campaign promis es of the Republican Administration. Hence, the 
failure to balance the budget dr ew demands for cuts in federal spending from 
four of the journals and for an incr ease in taxes from Forbes . 16 
The business publi cations occasionally commented upon Mr. Nixon's per-
sonality , behavioral style, and staff during his first administration. While at 
first all of the journals overwhelmingly approved of his appointments , The 
Wall Street Journal gradually began expressing reservations about the abilities 
of the White Hous e staff. It indicated that the men closest to the President 
were amateur s in politics and tended to be "yes" men who were not noted for 
their skills or initiati ve. 17 The journal and Busin ess W eek particularly ques-
tioned the Nixon style. Whil e his policies and actions were usually seen as 
praiseworthy, they found his rhetoric to be disappointing and inappropriate. 18 
14 For example , reactions to President ixon's efforts to control inflation fluctuated over time. 
Generally the business spokes men held high expec tations of his ability to stabilize the econom y 
when he first took office, but confide nce ebbe d as tim e passed without any significant improve-
ment . Critici m ofhis anti-inflation pr ograms reached a peak in 1970 and ear ly 1971. Then despite 
the fact that all of the journals oppose d wage-price controls in principle , they accepted Nixon's 
institution of controls in 1971 and rallied to his suppo rt , sugges ting that the unusual circumstances 
required drastic actions. 
15 The journals gene rally agreed with his Vietnamization strategy of slowly withdrawing 
American troops while negotiating a settleme nt with North Viet am. Criticisms , however, were 
voiced during the Cambodian crisis when it appeared that American involvement was deepening . 
Many of the publications supported ixon's relative reductions in the defense shar e of the 
national budge t and urged him to abandon contro versial defense programs such as the AB M's. 
For more detailed data indicating the fairly dovish positions of a significant porti on of the 
American business community see Russett and Hans on, op. cit . 
16 Nation 's Business (May, 1972) p. 80; Business Week Gune 24, 1972) p. 124; The Wall Street 
Journal Ganuary 28, 1972), p . 10; and Forbes Gune 1, 1972) p. 15. 
11 The Wall Street Joumal (February 11, 1972) p . 8, (Sep tember 11, 1972) p. 20, (October 23, 
1972) p. 8, and (Decembe r 20, 1972) p . 14. 
18 lbicl., (October 29, 1971) p. 8, and (February 6, 1971) p . 94. 
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"Watergate" 19 received only scant attention from these five publications 
during 1972. Business Week, Fortune , and Forbes were the only ones to 
comment on any of the interrelated scandals, and they limited their editorial 
opinions to the ITT question. The three expressed the belief that the settle-
ment had been typical and far from overly advantageous to ITT. evertheless, 
Business Week and Fortune were critical of the way in which the agreement 
had been reached saying that it had aroused needless suspicion. 20 
There were significant differences in the amounts of attention given to the 
various issues by the journals. Table 3 shows the proportion of each journal's 
ixon editorials devoted to the major issue areas. Fortune, Business Week, 
and Nation's Business had a much greater relative emphasis on economic and 
budgetary affairs than the other two publications. The Wall Street journal and 
Forbes, on the other hand , placed more emphasis on foreign affairs and 
defense issues. In addition to attracting a readership more interested in 
international business matters, the wider interests of The Wall Street journal 
probably derived from its role as a newspaper , while Forbes ' editorial policy 
primarily reflected the interests of editor Malcolm Forbes , a moderate-to-
liberal Republican. 
TABLE 3. Relative Attention Given to Policy Area By Business Journals, 
1969-1972 
Fortune Bus. Week Nat. Bus. Forbes Wall St.]. 
Economic-Budgetary. 50% 49% 43% 24% 18% 
Domestic . '.' ...... 27 25 27 18 21 
Foreign-Defense .... 12 13 8 31 20 
The five journals cover the full ideological spectrum. Nation's Business, the 
official magazine of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, expressed the most 
traditional and conservative views. It devoted a considerable number of its 
editorials to attacks upon Nixon's domestic programs , taking the position that 
federal expenditures had to be reduced to prevent further damage to the 
economy through rising inflation. The Wall Street journal and Business Week 
represented mildly conservative to moderate interests. The Journal also 
wanted to reduce the role of the federal government in American life and to 
have a balanced budget but supported Nixon's welfare and health programs as 
practical solutions to major domestic problems. Business Week held views 
19 In this paper , the term "Watergate " is used to refer to all of the matters that the U. S. House 
of Repres entatives' Judiciary Committe e had under investigation for impea chment. 
2° Forbes (April 15, 1972) p. 21; Busin ess Week (March 4, 1972) p . 140, and (June 24, 1972) p. 
124; and Fortun e (May, 1972) pp . 151-152. 
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TABLE 4. Rankings of the Business Journals Over the First Nixon Ad-
ministration 











Busin ess Week 
Nat. Busin ess 
Fo·rtun e 
Emphasis on 
Economic Issu es 
Fortun e 
Busin ess Week 
Nation's Busin ess 
Forbes 






Nat. Busin ess 
similar to thos e of the Journal on dom estic and budgetary issues but seemed 
more willing to accept government interv ention in th e economy to smooth out 
business cycles. Fortune and Forbes expr esse d mor e liberal ideas. A prim e 
emp hasis of Fortune was upon the need to restor e dom estic tranquility with 
the President taking th e lead in achieving social equality. Yet , Fortun e still 
adhere d to some classical economic th eories with regard to free trad e and 
monopolies. Forbes ' editorials supported a dynamic presid ency and govern-
ment programs for dom estic improv ement . Ev en incom e redistribution 
through higher incom e taxes was not an anath ema to Forbes . 21 
The differing ideological orientations of these journals might be explained 
in part by th e int eres ts, attitudes , and geographic distribution of their sub-
scribe rs. Nation's Busin ess' conservatism may reflec t the facts that 67% of its 
professional subscribers came from small busin esses and industri es and that it 
bas the highest southern circulation of th e five journals. 22 Small businessmen 
have long been consider ed the most conservative segment of the business 
comm unity , 23 and the South is th e most conservative region of the country. 
The more liberal emphasis of Fortun e and Forbes might result from the mor e 
cosmopo litan viewpoint of th eir subscribers since th ey have th e highest 
proportion of board chairmen readers to total circulation. 24 
It is possible th en to distinguish betwee n th e editorial positions of the five 
journals at the end of Pr esident Nixon's first term . Table 4 ranks them 
accord ing to support for the Pres ident , attention to economic issues , and 
ideology. Forbes gave by far th e most positiv e evaluations of the President , 
and The Wall Steeet Journal th e leas t. Yet , th e Journal was not actually as 
critical as some of the other publications. It was second only to Forbes in the 
21 Forbes Qune 1, 1972) p. 15. Clark, op. cit., discusses these ideological differe nces in much 
more detail. 
22 Nation's Busi.ness, Subscriber Analysis (May, 1972) p. 5. 
23 Truman , op. cit., p. 183. 
24 Nation's Busin ess, Subscriber Analysis (May, 1972) p . 5. 
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low proportion of critical comments, while Fortune had the highest proportion 
of criticism. It also devoted the highest proportion of its ixon editorial .s to 
economic issues as opposed to the] ournal , a newspaper with the most diverse 
readership among the five journals, which had the least emphasis on economic 
matters. 
THE AFTERMATH OF WATERGATE 
During the early months of 1973, most of the journals continued to be 
highly supportive of President Nixon; but in the second half of the year, when 
the enormity of Watergate became apparent, his popularity tumbled greatly. 
This section of the paper will examine the overall effect of Watergate revela-
tions upon presidential support showing the slippage over time and will 
compare the relative amount of editorial attention given to the scandal by the 
various publications. In particular , business perspectives on Watergate and 
economic matters will be contrasted. The findings will then be compared with 
poll data concerning the attitudes toward Nixon among business and profes-
sional people. Finally, the four hypotheses outlined at the beginning of this 
study will serve to summarize the analysis. 
An Overview of Declining Support 
By the end of his administration , President Nixon's support had suffered 
tremendously in all of the journals except the conservative Nation's Business 
where it remained about the same. Table 5 compares the average evaluations 
of the journals for Nixon's first term with those for his shortened second one. 
Nation's Business had become progressively more critical of Nixon dming his 
first term, but his efforts to reduce federal spending had improved his image 
during the early part of the second term. While Watergate was deplored, it 
had no overwhelming effects on Nation 's Business ' evaluations of the Presi-
dent. The Wall Street journal , however, devoted considerable attention to the 
scandal, and its level of criticism rose sharply over that of the previous four 
years. 25 Business Week's growing criticism of Nixon was accelerated by the 
revelations of the scandal. It feared that his ability to govern was being 
completely undermined by the credibility gap. Certainly he was no longer 
able to cope as stringently with the economic problems of the nation. Fortune 
and Forbes shared this view, feeling that Nixon was so distracted by Watergate 
that he had let the economy and energy crisis go beyond control because he 
was afraid to make unpopular decisions. 26 Thus, the chief concern of these 
25 The journal could not fathom Nixon's handling of the crisis. While he was considered very 
astute in handling foreign affairs and most domestic issues , he seemed surprisingly inept at 
reducing this "second-rate burglary " to its true level of importanc e . (The Wall Street Journal 
(March 21, 1973) p. 20). Until August , 1974, it never assumed I ixon himself to be guilty but 
repeatedly berated his nonprofessional staff. 
26 Business Week (May 21, 1973) p. 204, and Gune 9, 1973) p. llO ; Fortune Ganuary , 1974) p. 
65; and Forbes (August 1, 1973) p. 13. 
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publications over the scandal revolved around its impact ~n ixon's economic 
policies. While none of them condoned the breach_ of eth1.cs and th~ attack on 
democratic principles , they tended to focus attent10n on its damagmg effects 
on what was to them more pertinent policy areas. 
TABLE 5. The Effect of Watergate on Evaluations of Nixon's Policies by 
Business Publications 
Positive Negative Neutral 
1969- 1973- 1969- 1973- 1969- 1973-
1972 1974 1972 1974 1972 1974 
Nation 's Business .... . . 51% 55% 29% 31% 20% 14% 
W. S. Journal .... .. .. .46 42 25 43 29 15 
Business Week .. .. . . . . 53 36 28 44 19 20 
Fortune .. .. .. . ... . ... 55 42 34 52 13 6 
Forbes ..... . ....... . . 78 51 9 33 20 16 
In addition to the decline in overall support during 1973-1974 as opposed to 
ixon' s first term , significant temporal variations occurred within this latter 
time period as well. The strongest impact of Watergate was felt during the 
second half of 1973. Table 6 shows the variations in the level of support for 
Nixon within the approximately twenty months of his second term. During 
the first half of 1973, all of the journals except Business Week , which was 
unhappy with the ending of economic controls under Phase III , retained very 
positive images of the ixon Presidency , approximately maintaining their 
level of support from the first term. A dramatic reversal occurred during the 
second half of the year. The overall editorial tone dropped to a substantially 
critical one in Forbes, Fortune , and The Wall Street Journal. Business Week 
continued a slightly negative evaluation, and even the support of Nation 's 
Business fell noticeably. The sharpest drop in support occurred in the two 
more liberal journals , Forbes and Fortune , whose proportion of favorable 
editorials fell from the middle 60%'s to the middle 20%'s. 
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TABLE 6. The Effect of Watergate Revelations Over Time 
Jan.-June July-Dec . Jan.-June July-Dec. 
1973 1973 1974 1974 
N % N % N % N % 
Nation's Business 
Positive .. . ....... 7 78 4 50 5 56 0 0 
Negative . . ' ... . .. l 11 4 50 3 33 l 33 
Neutral ........ . .. l 11 0 0 l 11 2 67 
W. S. Journal 
Positive .... . ... . . 58 52 38 36 35 43 7 27 
Negative ......... 42 38 58 54 29 35 11 42 
Neutral ...... . .... 12 11 11 10 18 22 8 31 
Business Week 
Positive . . ...... . . 20 38 15 39 4 20 4 44 
Negative .. . .... . . 22 42 17 45 9 45 5 56 
Neutral .. .. ....... 11 21 6 16 7 35 0 0 
Fortune 
Positive .......... 13 62 4 24 3 38 1 25 
egative .... . .. . . 6 28 13 76 5 63 2 50 
Neuh·al .... . . . ... . 20 10 0 0 0 0 1 25 
Forbes 
Positive .......... 12 67 6 28 7 54 4 80 
egative .. . . . .. . . 3 17 12 57 3 23 l 20 
Neutral . .......... 3 17 3 14 3 23 0 0 
Yet, by early 1974, Nixon's support started to recover slightly . The propor-
tion of favorable to negative comments increased in all the publications but 
Business Week and was especially pronounced in Forbes. This recovery, 
however , was accompanied by a significant decrease in the amount of atten-
tion given to the Nixon Adminish·ation. The number of Journal editorials fell 
from 107 to 82 from the second half of 1973 to the first six months of 1974; and 
this drop was much sharper in Business Week , Fortune , and Forbes whose 
combined total of editorials fell from 76 to 41. To some extent , then , silence 
may have been substituted for direct criticism as the journals waited to see 
how ixon's political and economic trials would end. This silence continued 
into the second half of 1974 when the number of ixon editorials dropped to 
nearly nothing. Although this reduced attention can be partly explained by 
the fact that the President resigned in August , there certainly were numerous 
events in July , August , and September that should have invited critical 
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comment. The incr ased negative tone of the editorials reflects the journals' 
relief that ixon did resign . 27 The ixon pardon in eptember brought 
additional comment with some division of opinion concerning its propriety. 28 
Watergate, of cour e, was not the only issue in which the journals w r 
int re ted during ixon's second term. Pr ident ixon was simultan ously 
faced with the en rgy crisis, runaway inflation , and th Middle East War , not 
tom ntion Vice President Agn w's prob) ms. The journals gave considerable 
att ntion to thos areas as well. Table 7 show the leve l of interest in and 
valuations of th e other policy issues (se Appendix II for a journal-by-
journal breakdown). 
TABLE 7. Evaluations of Specific Aspects of the ixon Administration, 
1973-1975 
Total Positive eu.tral 
\ at rgate . . .. ..... ........... .... 157 28 94 35 
~ anomic Policy ........ ' ......... 95 40 36 19 
taff .. ' .. ' ....................... 63 29 30 4 
En rgy Crisis ......... ............ 49 22 20 7 
Budg tary Policy .................. 47 36 8 3 
For ign Policy .................... 46 35 6 5 
Dome tic Policy ... ' ..... ' ........ 44 30 9 5 
Personal Atb·ibut sand Style ....... 33 6 23 4 
l ixon Pardon ..................... 13 4 5 4 
Executiv Reorganization ........... 11 2 6 3 
D ~ nse Policy ... ................. 7 4 2 1 
gnew Scandal ' .... ' ............. 7 4 2 1 
Pre s Relations ' .................. 6 2 4 0 
Ford omination .................. 5 3 2 0 
Many of the area where Presid nt ixon r ceived high leve ls of cri ticism 
were related to the scandal, such as comments upon his poorly qualifi d staff, 
his r lations with the press, and his personality and style of operation. How-
27 The Wall Street journal considered resignation his only reasonable alternative in the face of 
the overwhelming evide nce which had come out against him. Forbes felt "e uphoria" after his 
resignation, and Forttme expressed relief. The Wall Str eet ]011mal (August 9, 1974) p. ; Forbes 
( eptembe r 1, 1974) p. 21; and Fortune ( eptember, 1974) p . 109. 
28 811 iness Week was outraged at the inequity of th pardon, while Forbes, Fortune , and 
\'a/ion's Business were concerned with the future political implication and the effect upon 
Republican fortunes in the upcoming ele lions . The journal was alone in supporting the pardon, 
J} ing that it would allow a faster heal ing of the Watergat e wounds. Busin ess Week (Sept emb r 
l4, 1974) p. 188; Forbes (0 toberl , 1974) p. 17; Fortun e (October , 1974) p. 140; ation's Busin ess 
(December, 1974) p. 13; and The Wall treet]o11nwl ( eptember 10, 1974) p. 20, and (Octob er 
18, 1974) p. 14. 
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ever, the journals were also unhappy with many of the Administration's 
economic policies. Although Phase III had failed to hold down inflation , none 
but Business Week approved of the price freeze and creation of Phase IV; and 
all were relieved when the controls ended altogether in the spring of 1974. In 
regard to the energy crisis, the journals felt that President Nixon had ignored 
critical shortages too long before the embargo began. They believed that 
actions should have been taken earlier and more urgently. Nevertheless, they 
did support Nixon's basically voluntary approach to cutbacks in energy use. 
On the positive side, the publications favored Nixon's budget cuts and 
urged Congress to hold the line on federal spending. Domestic program in 
the fields of housing , busing , and the abolition of the OEO were supported. 
The journals liked his foreign policies as much as ever. The new Arab rap-
proachement was particularly welcomed. Even the Agnew affair won Presi-
dent ixon support as The Wall Street journal stated that his neutral stand on 
the charges was the only intelligent position that he could possible have 
taken. 29 
The Relative Impact of Economic Deterioration and Watergate 
It is difficult to isolate Watergat e as the most important factor in the decline 
in support for President Nixon because so many other issues of vital concern to 
businessmen were going sour at the same time. In absolute terms , the 
Watergate scandal stands out as the lightning rod for busin ess criticism of the 
ixon Administration during 1973-1974 . There were twice as many critical 
comments as positive ones, 156 to 69, concerning Watergate and the related 
issues of Presidential staff, personal attributes and style, pardon , and relations 
with the press , while the minor area of executive reorganization was the only 
other one in which negative comments outnumbered positive ones. Despite 
the continued enthusiasm for Nixon's foreign policy and gains in th e popular-
ity of his domestic programs and budgetary initiatives , there was a substantial 
deterioration in the evaluations of his economic policies . In contrast to the 
over two-to-one ratio of favorable to unfavorable comments during the first 
term, the ratio for the second term was only slightly positive for economic 
policy and the closely related energy field , indicating considerable business 
concern over their "bread-and-butter" issues. Moreover , the growing eco-
nomic problems may well have caused the business spokesmen to regard 
Nixon's Watergate problems more critically than they would have had they 
been more satisfied with his economic performance . As noted above, much of 
the business criticism of Watergate focused mor e on its economic effects than 
on questions of political morality . 
The six most important issue areas for the first Nixon Administration, which 
constitute six of the eight most important ones for 1973-1974 (Watergate and 
29 The Wall Street Journal (October 5, 1973) p. 8. 
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energy were th e two new major issues), are compared betwe en th e two tim e 
per iods in Tabl e 8 to give a mor e precis e idea of the relative imp act of 
Watergate and economic consid erations upon the deterioration of busin ess 
support for Nixon. The first column in Table 8 pr ese nts the proportion of the 
total numb er of editoria l comments (positive, neutral , and negativ e) on each 
issue area of th e 1973-1974 period to the 1969-1972 one. Variations among 
these ratios indicate which issues were given mor e editorial emphasis during 
the Watergate period relative to th e first Administration. Th e second column 
gives an ordinal measur e of association - gamma - for relating th e relativ e 
fa orableness of the comments on each area between th e two tim e periods . 30 
Positive gamma s show that ixon's position on an issue was mor e favorably 
viewed durin g 1973-1974 than during his first term , and negative gammas 
indicate that his position was evaluated less favorably in the 1973-1974 period . 
TABLE 8. Comparison of First and Second Term Editorials by Issue Area 
Issue Area 
Personality and Style 
Staff ........ . ... . .... . 
Economic Policy .. .... . 
Foreign Policy ........ . 
Domestic Policy ... ... . 
Budget .............. . 















The data in Tabl e 8 suggest that Wat ergat e, whatever its int erconn ec tions 
with econo mic evaluations , played a substantial independ ent role in th e 
falling popularity of Pres ident Nixon. Eva luations were mor e negative during 
the second term for only thr ee of th e six issues indicating that the deterioration 
of supp ort for the Pr esident was confined to specific policy areas. Nixon's mor e 
con ervati ve budgetary policies were particularly remarkabl e in this regard as 
editorial evalua tions chang ed from a 2:3 negative ratio to a 4½: 1 positiv e one; 
and, to a lesse r extent , a similar trend can also be discerned regarding 
domestic policy. Th e two areas of staff and personality , which were dir ec tly 
related to President 1ixon's Wat ergate troubl es, form perhaps the most 
striking feature of Tabl e 8. They rank first and third in relative emph asis 
durin g 1973-1974. For exampl e, although ixon's second term was only half as 
3° For each of the six issue areas. a four-fold table was constru cted with the two column s being 
the first term and the second term and the two rows being positive and nega tive evaluations (note 
the exclusion of the neu tral comme nts here). Gammas were then comput ed from the numbers of 
edit_orials falling into these four ce lls. For the comput ation formula, ee Hub er t M. Blalock, Jr ., 
Soc,a/ Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company , 1972) p . 424. 
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long as his first , there were 40% mor e comm ents on staff during it than for 
1969-1972. A tr emendous negative swing in the editorial perceptions of these 
two issue areas also occurred as both had gammas of less than - . 6. The 
aforementioned decline in support for Nixon 's economic polici es, in contras t , 
only result ed in a gamma of -.3. In sum, th e two Wat ergat e-related areas 
stand out for the ir increas e in relativ e salience and pronounced nega tive shif t 
in tone of editorial comment; and th e effec ts of Watergat e did not prev ent the 
busin ess community from applauding a favored shift in budg etary policy. 
Th e five journals did not grant equal attention to the scandal. Tabl e 9 shows 
the percentag e of ixon editorials and features devoted to Watergat e. The 
Wall Street Journal stands out as exac tly half of its ixon editorials concerned 
Wat ergat e. Forbes and Busin ess Week, on the other hand , paid relatively littl e 
attention to it. Although Nation's Busin ess gave relatively mor e comm entary 
on th topic , it was not as critical of Wat ergate as the other journals , seeing it as 
just another political scandal among many in American history . 31 Except for 
The journal , the publications paid nearly twice as much attention to issues 
affec ting the economy as to Watergat e. 
TABLE 9. Relative Attention Given to Watergate by Business Journals 
w. s. Nat. Bus. 
Journal Bus. Fortun e Forbes Week 
Wat ergate . ..... . ... 50% 28% 22% 19% 13% 
Economic-Budg etary . 14 38 32 30 44 
En ergy .. ... ........ 5 10 14 9 16 
Dom es tic ........... 8 10 8 2 9 
For e ign-Defens e .... 11 0 8 16 4 
* The Watergate category includes com ments regardin g personality and style , the pardon , and 
press relations that were conn ected with the scandal. 
An examination of the journals ' specific criticisms during the second half of 
1973 when the dissatisfaction with the ixon Administration was expressed 
reinforc es this conclusion. In Table 10, The Wall Street Journal is again 
spot lighted by its concern with Watergate as 78% of its critical comments 
during thi key period were dir ec ted at Wat ergat e-related matt ers. Forbes 
and Fortun e were next with approximately half of their criticisms related to 
the scandal. Busin ess W eek and Nation's Busin ess, howeve r, were more 
critical of ixon's eco nomic and dom estic polici es than of Wat ergat e; and 
Fortune's concern with these two areas equal ed that with Wat ergat e . Thus , 
the impr ess ion from Tabl e 8 that Wat ergat e dominat ed busin ess criti cism of 
31 Nation's Business (D ecember , 1973) p. 4, and (Februa,y , 1974) pp. 11-12. 
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the second Nixon Admini str ation app ears to be primaril y an artifact _of The 
Wa ll Stree t Journa l's edit orial policy and its relative ly large numb er of edit o-
rials. Eve n at the height of the Watergate fallout , thr ee of th e five journal s 
devoted as mu ch or more criti cism to economic and domes tic matt ers as to the 
scandal. Fo r them, th e redu ced support for Pr esident ixon may well have 
been substantially influ enced by hi s failur e to solve th e economic pr oblems. 
TABLE 10. Areas of Criticism , July-December, 1973 
W. S. Bu s. N at . 
Journal Forb es Fortun e W eek Bu s. 
Waterga te . . . • • • • • • • 45 6 6 6 1 
Econo my-E nergy-Bud ge t 8 3 4 7 1 
Domestic ...... •• • • • l 0 2 2 2 
Fo reign-D efense . . . . 2 2 0 0 0 
Exec utive Reorg .. . .. 0 0 0 2 0 
Agnew ... . ... •••••• 0 l l 0 0 
Ford omination . ... 2 0 0 0 0 
-
Total ......... . · · · · · 58 12 13 17 4 
These conclu sions are str engthened by th e summ ary of th e five journ als' 
overall evalua tions for the entir e 1973-1974 period cont ained in Table 11. Th e 
first column is the total numb er of negative references to Watergate and 
related matt ers (staff, personal attribut es and style, and pr ess relations). Th e 
second takes nega tive Watergate comm ent s as a percent age of the nega tive 
evalua tions from all issue areas to show th e relative imp ortance of Watergate 
in each journ al's overa ll criti cism of th e Nixon Admini stra tion ; and the third is 
the perce ntage that th ese negative comm ents form of all po sitive and negative 
editorials on Watergate (neutral remarks are not includ ed here) which indi-
cates the relative leve l of criti cism by each journal of Nixon 's Wat ergat e 
activities. Th e p roportions of negative to nega tive plu s positive comm ent s for 
major int ern al (economic , energy, dom es tic, and bud ge tary) policies and for 
ju st econom ic and energy policies toge th er (since Table 8 showe d that the ir 
aggregate app roval ratin gs were much less than for th e domestic and bud ge t-
ary areas) compose columns four and five respectively. Th ey can be comp ared 
with Table 8 to show the leve l of Watergate critici sm relative to other areas of 
more d irec t profess ional concern to the bu siness community. 
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TABLE 11. Differences in the Journals' Evaluations of Watergate, 1973-
1974 
Sum .\'eJ!. Neg \\"t1tc-rgal e/ .\ 'eg/Pos + -"<'I!. \ 'epJPo.t + Neg ,\ 'eg/ .Vc•g + Pos 
\\ 'a terl!,ate .\lt .\',•uatic;e \\ 'nter1I.c1te lnt enu,/ Ero nomic•Energy 
Co mments Co mments Co mme11h Comr1-.ents• Comments 
W.S.} . . ' .. 103 75% 70% 31% 52% 
Fortune . .. 13 54 87 43 53 
Forbes .... 9 47 47 22 33 
Nat. Bus. 4 44 67 25 17 
Bus. Week 20 38 80 45 47 
* Includ es economic , energy , dom estic and budg etary issue areas . 
Table 11 quite definitely confirms the leading role of The Wall Street 
Journal in the Watergate criticism as 69% of all negative comments came from 
the Journal. The Journal is also exceptiona l in that Watergate constitu ted 
three-fourths of its critical comments during the second term , while for the 
other four journals non Watergate criticism formed about 50% or more of their 
negative evaluations (note that these percentages do not depart drastically 
from the ones in Table 10 for the Jul y-December, 1973 subperiod alone). 
Among the other four journals there is a slight tendency for Nation's Business 
and Business Week , the pair that is more conservative, to devote relatively less 
of their criticism to Watergate than Fortune and Forbes. In the specif ic 
evaluations that were made about Watergate, however , the W. S.]. was not so 
negative as Fortune and Business Week and approximated the percentage of 
Nation's Business which, as observed above, gave President Nixon the most 
support during his second term. The surprising ly low negative percentage for 
the liberal Forbes resulted from positive comments on ixon's staff (8 to 3) 
which offset negative ones on Watergate itself (1 to 6). 32 Finally , comparing 
Watergate to editorial perceptions of other internal policies demonstrates that 
the Watergate actions were much more harshly evaluated than Nixon's en-
deavors in other flelds in all five journals , liberal and conservative alike, even 
when the relatively often criticized economic and energy policies are consid-
ered by themselves. 
Assessing the relative impact of Watergate and economic factors upon the 
decline of business support for President ixon, hence, produces some am-
biguous evidence . On the one hand, much of the Watergate criticism was 
phrased in terms of Watergate's implications for economic policy-making; 
general support for the Administration in the realms of economic and energy 
policy declined significant ly; ,md all the publications except The Wall Street 
32 Most of this prais e was bestowed upon Henry Kissinger . Georg e Schultz , William imon, 
\Villiam Rogers, and Ambassador Annenburg also rece ived favorable comm ents . 
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Jot1rnal devoted substantial amounts of criticism to areas other than Water-
gate. On the other hand, Watergate drew proportionately much greater 
criticism compared both to issue positions during the President's first term 
and to other issues during the second term; and these trends existed in both 
liberal and conservative publications. In sum, while Watergate criticism was 
undoubtedly intertwined to some degree with other increasingly negative 
busine s perceptions of Nixon , a significant amount of disillusionment with 
the Watergate actions per se also occurred. Despite this sharp criticism of 
Watergate , however , the editorials did not strongly emphasize moral issues; 
and there were few, if any, calls for Nixon's removal as punishment for 
"breaking the rules of the political game." 
Editorial Evaluations and Indicators of Public Opinion 
The levels of approval and disapproval of President ixon's policies ex-
pressed by the five business journals were very consistent with those stated by 
samples of business and professional people. The Gallup organization con-
ducts regular polls about popular approval of the way in which the President 
handles his job, and the respondents are classified according to occupation. 33 
Although the business and professional category includes more than 
businessmen, it should generally indicate the feelings of members within that 
group. Table 12 compares the average level of approval and disapproval 
expressed by the professional respondents with the average evaluations of the 
five journals. Although the editorials generally had a higher proportion of 
neutral comments, the level of support for President ixon given by the 
sample and the editorials was very close with only a few percentage points 
separating them for most of the first three years. 
During the latter part of 1971, the business and professional sample began 
to take a more positive stance toward the President than the journals' editorial 
pages did. This gap widened in the first half of 1972 and remained pronounced 
through the first six months of 1973. Perhaps, individual businessmen had 
anticipated more beneficial effects from the Administration's wage-price con-
trols than the journals did. There was a greater decline in Nixon's popularity 
among the business and professional respondents than .in the editorial col-
umns during the latter part of 1973 so that the two rates of approval were again 
almost precisely the same. 
33 Gallup Opi11io11 Index Qanuary , 1969 - October , 1974). 
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TABLE 12. Comparisons of Business Journa l Evaluations With Business 
and Profess ional Opinion 






Percentage of Journal Comments 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 
½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ 
71% 60% 59% 59% 50% 53% 45% 50% 52% 35% 41% 34% 
11 17 31 23 25 27 31 29 34 54 37 43 
18 23 10 18 25 20 24 21 14 11 21 23 
Percentage of Business and Professional Opini on 
68% 65% 64% 59% 54% 60% 62% 66% 63% 35% 28% 29% 
9 22 28 32 38 32 31 27 30 56 63 64 
23 13 8 9 8 8 7 7 7 9 9 7 
SO RCE: For pub lic opin ion data. Gallup Opinion Ind ex Uanuary , 1969-October , 1974). 
In early 1974, how eve r , th e sampl e's evaluation of ixon continued to fall in 
conh·ast to the recove ry that he mad e in th e journals , reve rsing th e dir ection 
of th e pr evious gap betwee n individual and journal evaluations . Th e journa ls 
may have bee n molified by the relativ ely success ful handling of the oil 
embargo and hoping that the Pr esident would be able to come to grips with 
inflation once th e economic contro ls were end ed . In th e final months of hi s 
administration , th e journals virtuall y ignor ed Mr . ixon. On th e other hand , 
individual bu sinessmen appeared to be much mor e forthright in expressing 
skepticism about ixon's remainin g effec tiveness as Pr esident. 34 
Th e busin ess and profe ssional respond ents tend ed to assume Pr esiden t 
1ixon to be guilty in the Wat ergat e affair fairly ear ly in th e unfolding scanda l 
but apparently did not consider it repulsiv e enough to warrant his ouster from 
office. 35 The Wall Street journal , th e only one of th e five busin ess publicatio ns 
to give in-d epth analysis of the scandal, in conh·ast , took a mor e neuh·al 
34 For examp le, in a ew York Tim es survey of 167 chief execu tives of major corpora tions taken 
during the summer of 1974, 80'1! stated that Waterga te had "se riously affec ted the Pres ident 's 
abi lity to handle the nation"s economic affairs." By August , 48% of Gallup's business and 
professional samp le preferred that Ford comp lete the term of office, while only 35% preferred 
ixon. Creed C. Black, "Leaders hip is the Question in the Fight Against Jnn ation," Th e 
Philad elphia Inq11ire1· Uuly 14, J.974) p. 7-D ; and Gallup Opinion Ind ex (September , 1974). 
35 As early as April , 1973, 50% of the business and professional respondents believed that 
Nixon knew abou t Watergate in advance; and in July, a vast majority of the samp le was not 
satisfied with Nixon's handling of the scandal and wanted him to release all of the evidence and 
make a clean explanat ion. Yet, the majority did not cons ider it a ser ious matter but "ju st politics." 
By April , 1974, the majority of the samp le believed that there was enough evidence for impeach-
ment, but 50% still did not want him removed from office. Gallup Opinion Ind ex ( lay, 1973) pp. 
6-7, (August , 1973) pp. 5-12, and (May, 1974) p. 5. 
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position waiting for all th e evidence to materialize. 36 After the release of 
additional tapes in August , 1974, both the majority of the business and 
professional sample and the]ou.rnal conceded Nixon's guilt, and the Journal 
called for his resignation. 37 ln regard to the ixon pardon , the sample shared 
the views of most of the business publications as 58% felt that Nix.on should be 
brought to trail and 50% opposed his being pardoned if convicted. 38 
This comparison of editorial comment and public opinion , then , lends more 
validity to the content analysis by showing a generally close correspondence 
between these two indicators of business perspectives. The journal strategy of 
withdrawal and silence is also highlighted by the increasing divergence in the 
upport percentages between the journal editorials and opinions of the busi-
ness and professional people in 1974. While these data do not directly address 
the question of whether economic or Watergate problems were more impor-
tant in the erosion of President ixon's popularity , the fact that wide-spread 
perc eptio ns of presidential culpability for Watergate were not coupled with a 
clamor for his ouster, at least until the summer of 1974, demonstrates that for 
the business elite breaking the political rules of the game is not a mortal sin. 
IMPLICATIO S 
Perhaps the best way to summarize these findings is to review the hypoth-
eses stated earlier in the paper. They receive only partial confirmation at best 
from the data presented here. Although it was expected that after the eruption 
of the Watergate scandal the level of support for President Nixon would 
radically decline in all of the journals from the average levels during his first 
term of office, it did not clearly do so. Editorial evaluations did move sharply 
in the expec ted direction in Forbes, Fortune, and The Wall Street Journal by 
the second half of 1973; and increasing criticism was especially notable in 
Watergate related fields. Business Week and Nation's Business , on the other 
hand , displayed a wholly different pattern of change. The ratio of criticism to 
support in Business Week had been growing progressively after 1971 because 
of dissatisfaction with ixonian economics, and this trend was not greatly 
36 The journal also wanted the impeachme nt heari ng to proceed with a full investigation of the 
chru·ges, not-because it presumed Nixon to be guilty but because it wanted to clear the air. The 
release of the first White Hou se trru1script s placed theJourna/ in an ambivalent position. It was 
glad that the President had finally placed th e evidence before the people. Its interpretation of the 
taped conversations tended to exonera te ixon of guilt in the break-ins ru1d cover-up. However, it 
was repulsed by his moral tone and pettiness which robbed him of public confidence. TheJounw/ 
was extremely conce rn ed that th e affair not be allowed to upset national stability and further 
divide the Americru1 people. At first it opposed resignation stating that if Presiden t Nixon had to 
go, he shou ld be given a fair and open heru·ing to assure the peopl e that the impeachment and 
conviction were just and not political. The \Vall Street Journal (May 2, 1974) p. 12, (May 3, 1974) 
p. 10, (May 7, 1974) p. 22, (May 9, 1974) p. 16, and (May 21, 1974) p. 24. 
37 Ibid. , (August 7, 1974) p . 10; ru1d Gallup Opinion Ind ex (Sept embe r, 1974). 
38 Gallup Opinion Ind ex (October , 1974). 
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altered by the Watergate revelations. 39 In Nation 's Business , the ratio of 
support went up during the second administration despite the scandal, 
perhaps in response to the President's shift to more conservative policies 
following the 1972 election. 
In addition , the shift in editorial positions during the later part of 1973 
appears only partially attributab le to Watergate. All of the journals were much 
more concerned with the economic impact of the scandal than with its implica-
tions for political morality , and only The Wall Street journal really directed 
extensive editorial comments to the Watergate issues. Further , from the 
substantial decrease in the number of comments about the Administration in 
most of the journals by early 1974, it appears that Watergate caused them to 
withdraw from ixon as a controversial topic too hot to handle. 
The second hypothesis that the more liberal journals would raise the 
question of moral integrity earlier and stress it more frequently may be 
rejected ouh·ight. Although there was a significant increa e in the number of 
critical comments in Forbes and Fortune , the most serious consideration of 
Watergate was not presented in either of them but in the moderately conse r-
vative Wall Street Journal. This fact is probably explained by the Journal's 
daily newspaper format. It has more space to devote to noneconomic matters, 
and its editorials could give more timely analysis as each phase of the scand al 
broke. Of the more liberal journals , Fortune had more in-depth coverage of 
Watergate through feature articles , while Forbes gave only short references to 
it in editorials. Moreover, the conservative Nation's Business gave propor-
tionately more attention to the scandal through editorials and James Kilpat-
rick's articles than the most liberal Forbes did. 
Th hypothesis that the more conservative journals would react primarily 
by confining their criticisms to the economic issues appears partially valid. 
Most of the publications confined their observations primarily to econom ic 
rather than political issues. The principal exception was The Wall Street 
Journal, a relatively conservative journal with half of its evaluations of ixon 
related to Watergate issues. Thus , the relative emphasis on economic as 
opposed to Watergate matters seems less tied to a liberal-conservative dimen-
sion than to the journals' normal coverage and editorial interest. The three 
journals having the highest proportion of their criticisms related to econom ic 
and domestic , as opposed to Watergate, issues - Fortune , Business Week, 
and Nation's Business - were the three most economically-oriented ones 
during Mr. ixon's first term. 
The evidence concerning the final hypothesis that the more conserva tive 
journals would more quickly raise their levels of support and argue that the 
39 See Clark , op cit ., Table l. From the beginningofl969 until June , 1971, Business Wee k was 
an enthusiastic supporter of the Nixon Administration with a 72/28 positive-to -negative ratio in its 
editorial comments. This fell to 10/7 in the second half of 1971 and 23/20 during 1972 before 
assuming the slightly negative tone for 1973 and 1974 reported in Tables 5 and 6. 
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ast be forgotten and oppose Nixon's removal from office is difficult to assess. 
~fany of the journals, liberal and conservative alike, dropped the topic as if 
afrajd to be involved. one, however , argued that the past be forgotten and 
Mr. Nixon forgiven. Except for the journal , they just seemed to be waiting to 
see what was going to happen , with Forbes only hinting that Nixon might not 
complete his term of office. 40 Thus , both liberal and conservative journals 
passed through a stage of passive tolerance of the Nixon Administration where 
they openly advocated neither support nor opposition. All but Nation's Busi-
ness expressed relief at his resignation , and only the journal had a good word 
for the pardon. 
This case study of the impact of Watergate on political support indicates a 
trong interrelationship between diffuse and specific support. President ix-
on's inability to cope adequately with either the problem of his loss of general 
public respect or with the specific demands for economic stability caused the 
business interests of the nation to withdraw significant levels of political 
support from him. Without sufficient diffuse support because of the scandal, 
Pr sident Nixon was without a solid political base for taking the desired 
stringent actions for improving the economy. It is difficult to determine 
whether his perceived violations of the American "rules of the game" or his 
economic setbacks helped to place him on the brink of impeachment. But with 
regard to the spokesmen for business, it appears that his economic failures 
rather than his moral shortcomings were of primary concern. Therefore , this 
study tends to confrrm Easton's theory that diffuse support is essential under 
conditions of stress when specific demands are difficult to meet , but does not 
confirm Truman's suggestion that leaders' violations of the "rules of the game" 
by themse lves bring about loss of support from interest groups. 
•
0 In a passing comme nt, Malcolm Forbes predicted that Edward Kennedy would be elected 
President in 1976 but that he might not be the next President of the United States. Forbes (May 
15, 1974) p. 41. 
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APPENDIX I 
Evaluations of Specific Aspects of the First 
Nixon Administration by Business Publication 
Nat . Bus. W. S. Journ al Bus. Wee k Fort une Forbes 
Economi c Policy 
Positive ... .. . ......... 17 6 44 17 15 
Negative . .. .. . ........ 8 3 21 14 2 
Neutral .. ..... . ... ... . 10 8 25 1 3 
Dom estic Policy 
Positiv e . .. .... . . . . . .. . 13 21 29 10 16 
Negative ........... . .. 15 5 14 7 0 
Neutral .... .. .. .. .. .. . 4 13 7 4 2 
For eign Policy 
Positiv e ...... . ....... . 7 29 14 5 14 
Negativ e . .... .. .. ... . . 0 2 5 1 4 
Neutral ......... . .... . 1 5 1 2 2 
Personal Attribut es 
and Style 
Positiv e 4 8 0 1 6 
Negativ e . . ... .. ...... . 1 12 1 1 0 
Neutral . ........... . .. 3 13 1 0 3 
Staff 
Positiv e ....... . ....... 9 4 7 2 12 
Negative ........... . .. 0 4 4 0 0 
Neutral ... . . . ....... . . 0 3 0 0 0 
Budg etary Policy 
Positiv e ........ . . . .. .. 2 1 3 3 3 
Negative . ............. 8 5 4 1 0 
Neutral ............ . .. 4 4 1 2 1 
Executive Reorgani zation 
Positive .. . . . . . .. . . . .. . 5 1 6 2 2 
Negative .............. 0 2 3 0 0 
Neutral .. . . .... . ...... 0 1 2 0 0 
Defense Policy 
Positiv e .... . .... . .... . 1 0 2 0 7 
Negative ....... .... . .. 0 0 4 0 3 
Neutral . . ...... . . . .... 0 0 2 0 1 
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APPE DIX II 
Evaluations of Specific Aspects of the Nixon 
Administration 1973-1974 by Business Publications 
Nat. Bus. W. S. Journal Bus. Week Fortun e Forbes 
Watergate 
Positive ......... ...... 1 24 2 0 1 
Nega tive ............ . . 3 68 11 4 6 
Neutral .. . ... .. ....... 1 32 0 0 2 
Economic Policy 
Positiv e ... . ..... ... ... 2 12 15 5 6 
ega hve ...... . .. . .... 1 13 13 5 4 
Neuh·al ....... . ... .... 1 3 11 2 2 
Staff 
Positiv e .. .... .... ..... 1 15 3 2 8 
Nega tive ............. . 0 17 7 3 3 
eutral ....... . ....... 0 2 1 0 1 
En ergy Crisis 
Positive ..... ... . ...... 3 7 8 2 2 
Negative .............. 0 8 7 5 0 
eutral ........ ... .... 0 0 4 0 3 
Budg etary Policy 
Positive .... .. .. . . . .... 6 14 7 4 5 
Nega tive .............. 1 1 6 0 0 
l eutral ............. .. 0 2 1 0 0 
For eign Policy 
Positiv e . .............. 0 23 3 4 5 
Negative .............. 0 4 1 0 1 
eutral ... .. ... ....... 0 4 1 0 0 
Dom estic Policy 
Positive .... ........... 1 22 4 2 1 
1ega tive .... ...... .. .. 2 3 2 2 0 
eutral .... .... ....... 0 0 5 0 0 
Personal Attribut es 
and Style 
Positiv e ............... 0 5 0 0 1 
egativ e .............. 1 16 0 6 0 
Neutral ............ .. . 0 4 0 0 0 
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APPE DIX II (Continued ) 
Na t. Bus. W. S. } 011rnal Bus . Week 
Nixon Pardon 
Positive .............. . 0 4 0 
ega tive .. ... .. ... . ... 1 2 1 
Neuh ·al . . ............. 1 2 0 
Executi ve Reorganization 
Positive ...... . . . ..... . 0 0 0 
Nega tive ... . ... . ... . .. 0 2 3 
eutr al ............... 1 2 0 
Defense Policy 
Positive ... . .... . ..... . 0 4 0 
ega tive ... . .... . ..... 0 0 0 
eut ral ...... . ....... . 0 0 0 
Agnew Scandal 
Positive .... .. ......... 0 4 0 
Nega tive .. .. .......... 0 0 0 
Neutral ............... 0 0 1 
Pr ess Relations 
Positive ............... 0 2 0 
ega tive ... ... ...... . . 0 2 2 
Neutr al ... . .... . ...... 0 0 0 
Ford omin ation 
Positive ... . .... . ...... 2 0 1 
Nega tive .............. 0 2 0 
eutral ...... . ..... . . . 0 0 0 
Fortun e Forbes 
0 0 
0 1 
1 0 
2 0 
0 1 
0 0 
0 0 
0 2 
0 1 
0 0 
1 1 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
